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The Belgian defence budget for 2018 
increases by a factor of 4.7 in 
commitment credits. Not only does this 
allow for offsetting the significant 
investment shortfalls of the previous 
years, it also provides a window of 
opportunity for regenerating the Belgian 
armed forces with a view to meeting 
future challenges. This Security Policy 
Brief makes the case that the long-
awaited modernisation of the major 
weapon systems needs to go hand in 
hand with a significant recruitment effort 
to address the critical human resources 
situation the Ministry of Defence finds 
itself in. Yet adding up personnel and 
equipment, the 25,000-strong force 
structure outlined in the Strategic Vision 
still risks being insufficient for meeting 
future requirements as they emerge in 
both the national and the international 
context (NATO/EU). As such, defence 
planners will need to engage with the 
question how best to redevelop the force 
structure from this minimum baseline in 
function of how the strategic 
environment evolves. For strengthening 
Belgium’s national security and 
diplomatic position in the twenty-first 
century the present window of 
opportunity is not to be missed. 
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The year 2018 promises to be the moment of 
truth for the Belgian Ministry of Defence, at 
least as far as the present legislative term is 
concerned. In 2014, the Federal Government 
Agreement stipulated that the Belgian 
government would “again provide the armed 
forces with the means to execute its missions”. 
It also highlighted the need to reserve sizeable 
investment space for equipment 
modernisation. The debate over what the latter 
should look like became the object of a 
Military Programmation Law, adopted on 11 
May 2017. Despite deep initial cuts in the 
defence accounts, the 2018 budget approved 
by parliament now features a dramatic increase 
of commitment appropriations for investing in 
military equipment. Over 12 billion EUR of 
commitment credits have been allocated in 
order to provide each military dimension and 
capacity with adequate equipment, while the 
corresponding payments will be spread over 
the period 2020-2030. What is one to make of 
these recent budgetary developments? Is the 
debate on the future of the Belgian armed 
forces now settled, provided that these 
budgetary promises are fulfilled? 
 
The turn of the tide in defence resourcing 
does not occur in a political vacuum. While 
the fundamental force behind this change is 
the deteriorating security environment, the 
timing is far from coincidental. Firstly, in July 
2018, Belgium will host the first fully-fledged 
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Fiscal Year Commitments Expenditures 
2014* 2.458.544 2.580.762 
2015* 2.327.688 2.460.484 
2016* 2.414.361 2.518.168 
2017° 2.550.998 2.480.751 
2018° 12.040.820 2.519.099 
 
Evolution of the Belgian defence budget 
(all figures x1000 current EUR; limited plus variable credits; * as realised or ° as budgeted by Parliament; source: 
parliamentary budget documents n° 54 1352/001, 54 2109/001 and 54 2690/001) 
NATO Summit in over a decade. As the Allies 
already agreed at the Wales Summit in 2014 
“to halt any decline in defence expenditure” 
and aim to increase defence outlays in real 
terms, Belgium is under intense pressure to 
make good on the promises Prime Minister 
Charles Michel made in 2016 and 2017.1 
Secondly, in December 2017 Belgium signed 
up to the Council Decision establishing 
Permanent Structured Cooperation amongst 
25 participating EU member states (PESCO). 
Correspondingly, the commitments to 
regularly increase the defence budget and to 
spend 2% and 20% of defence expenditure on 
research and technology, and on capability 
investment, respectively, are now enshrined in 
EU law.2 Thirdly, in the spring of 2019 
Belgium will be gearing up for its next federal 
elections. This means that 2018 remains the 
last full year to deliver on the remaining 
promises of the Government Agreement, 
most notably but not exclusively the decision 
to replace the F-16 air combat capability and 
other major platforms. Fourth and finally, 
these considerations are driven by a steadily 
deteriorating security environment and a 
growing sense of ‘strategic unease’.3 The 2016 
terrorist attacks in Brussels have made clear 
that security problems do not necessarily 
remain ‘far away’ problems. Moreover, the 
operational tempo that the Belgian armed 
forces have maintained in response to these 
challenges is not sustainable based on present 
resourcing parameters. Ultimately, the 
budgetary debate therefore reflects a 
fundamental matter of national security. 
To help inform this debate, this Egmont 
Security Policy Brief previews the strategic 
outlook the Belgian armed forces face in 2018. 
After more than three decades of budgetary 
restraint and organisational downsizing, the 
regeneration of the armed forces has become 
imperative. The first section discusses the 
modernisation of the major weapon systems. 
This constitutes the debate for which the 2017 
Military Programmation Law and the 2018 
budget have now set the stage. The second 
section deals with the human resources 
challenge the Ministry of Defence faces. While 
the age structure of the Belgian force structure 
has been scantly discussed in the context of 
raising the retirement age, the need to recruit 
much higher numbers of young men and 
women in uniform will constitute the key 
challenge for the coming decade. The third 
section then turns to the relationship between 
the force structure and the future security 
environment that Belgian governments will 
face. Even a fully-funded, 25,000 strong 
military is likely to be inadequate for meeting 
future obligations to Belgian citizens and their 
international partners. The reason is 
straightforward: the present and future force 
structure is based on a logic of peacetime, 
whereas the possibility of major conflict on the 
European continent is perhaps still remote, but 
surely no longer inconceivable. The deepest 
challenge for Belgian defence planners relates 
to the question of how to respond to future 
contingencies that could be vastly more 
challenging in operational terms than the 
experience of recent decades. 
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MODERNISING THE MAJOR WEAPON 
SYSTEMS 
In the run-up to the 2014 federal elections, a 
debate emerged on the future of the Belgian 
armed forces.4 The incoming Minister of 
Defence Steven Vandeput was tasked to 
deliver a strategic orientation on the future 
capability portfolio, the required human 
resources and the associated budgetary 
framework. To this purpose, a series of 
consultations with the defence staff, the 
academic community and other stakeholders 
took place.5 On 29 June 2016, the Belgian 
government took note of the resulting Strategic 
Vision for Defence.6 This document offered the 
armed forces a perspective on growth, most 
notably by committing to a budgetary envelope 
of 9.2 billion EUR in major equipment 
programmes over the time horizon 2020-2030. 
With a view to consolidating political support 
for this budgetary commitment, the Belgian 
Parliament adopted a Military Programmation 
Law for the timeframe 2016-2030.7 Although 
Belgian national budgets are only legally 
binding for one year, as the Council of State 
observed in its parliamentary advice, the 
proposed law was approved with broad 
support, namely with 82 votes in favour, 50 
against and 3 abstentions in the plenary 
session.8 Against this background, initial steps 
towards the procurement of major weapon 
systems could be taken. As in any long journey, 
the question is now: are we there yet? 
 
The capability portfolio outlined in the 
Strategic Vision and the Military 
Programmation Law is built around four 
dimensions: land, air, maritime and intelligence 
(including the cyber domain). These accounted 
for roughly 2.21 billion, 3.94 billion, 2.05 
billion and 0.74 billion EUR respectively.9 Key 
highlights included the acquisition of a new 
land combat vehicles, a successor for the F-16 
fighter fleet as well as two frigates and six 
mine-hunting vessels. To this purpose, the 
Belgian government authorised a strategic 
partnership with the French government by 
participating in the Scorpion land warfare 
programme.10 This should result in the 
acquisition of 60 Jaguar and 417 Griffon 
vehicles in the timeframe 2025-2030. It also 
authorised the release of a Request for 
Government Proposal inviting different 
partners to propose a future air combat 
capability to the Belgian Air Force.11 In 
response, the US and UK governments 
responded with initial offers built around the 
Eurofighter Typhoon and the Lockheed 
Martin F-35 programmes, with ‘best and final 
offers’ submitted on 14 February 2018.12 
Pending the technical assessment phase, this 
process will enable the Belgian government to 
take a decision for procuring thirty-four new 
fighter jets in time for the planned phase-out 
of the F-16 fleet starting in 2023. Finally, the 
Belgian and Dutch Ministers of Defence signed 
a letter of intent and programme arrangements 
for a joint replacement of the current M-
frigates and Tripartite-class mine 
countermeasure vessels. These new ships are to 
be developed under Dutch and Belgian lead, 
respectively, and are set to enter service in 
2025. Finally, an important effort in improving 
Belgium’s position in the intelligence and 
influence domain is planned. The latter 
includes the acquisition of Medium Altitude 
Long Endurance drones, participation in the 
French Composante Spatiale Optique satellite 
imagery project and a wide-ranging update of 
the IT-network architecture of the military 
intelligence service. 
 
The choice to regenerate the Belgian armed 
forces by building deep partnerships with 
different international partners – with France 
in the land domain, with the Netherlands in the 
maritime domain and, presumably, with an 
Anglo-Saxon partner in the air domain – 
indicates a distinct preference for balanced 
alliances and multilateral cooperation.13 It 
commits Belgium to maintaining a balanced 
force structure that is fully embedded in 
European as well as transatlantic frameworks. 
What is now important is to make full use of 
the window of opportunity the 2018 budget 
offers to translate these choices into 
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contractual commitments. The NATO Summit 
in Brussels and the accompanying PESCO 
dynamic constitute a moment in time not to be 
missed. This relates not only to the medium-
term future – namely to ensure the continued 
availability of key combat systems in the 2020s 
– but also with the long-term future beyond 
the 2030 horizon. Most notably, the focus on 
increasing funding for research, technology 
and development offers a major opportunity 
for consolidating and expanding the Belgian 
and European defence technological and 
industrial base. In the timeframe of the 2040s, 
this may lead to the emergence of a genuinely 
cross-European option for air combat 
capability, which is presently not on offer. 
 
If these programmes proceed as planned, the 
regeneration of the Belgian armed forces is 
belatedly coming on track as far as the 
modernisation of its principal weapon systems 
is concerned. Should contractual commitments 
fail to materialise during this legislative period, 
however, it becomes very likely that major 
equipment shortfalls will materialise in the 
2020s. In turn, this would further undermine 
the already tenuous condition of Belgium’s 
national security and diplomatic position. 
These investments constitute a necessary 
precondition for maintaining a skeleton force 
that can be beefed up and adapted by future 
governments as circumstances dictate. Yet 
having modern equipment available is by itself 
not enough. Any defence establishment is 
critically dependent on sufficient numbers of 
well-trained and motivated personnel. It are 
the men and women wearing the uniform that 
breathe life into the force structure. Yet in this 
regard, the outlook at the start of 2018 is far 
from promising. 
 
HUMAN RESOURCES AS THE CRITICAL 
BOTTLENECK  
The lack of balance in the age pyramid of the 
armed forces will constitute the Achilles heel 
of the Belgian defence well into the 2020s and 
possibly beyond. Successive downward 
revisions of the targeted end-strength of the 
military after the suspension of conscription in 
1994 have led to a personnel structure heavily 
dominated by those close to retirement. The 
budget cuts and pension reforms during the 
present legislative period have substantially 
aggravated this problem. During the year 2016, 
for instance, recruitment was initially capped at 
700 military posts (eventually revised upwards 
to 900), whereas no less than 2,458 employees 
left due to retirement, death or termination of 
contract.14 Given this quasi-freefall in human 
resources, the challenge is not how to 
downsize the force from its 2018 level of 
29,225 men and women in uniform to the 
25,000 level the Strategic Vision puts forward 
(including 1,000 defence civilians). Rather, it is 
to avoid crashing through this objective and 
sinking to far lower numbers. Such an 
implosion of the personnel structure would 
have grave consequences as far as operational 
output capacity is concerned. A constant focus 
on recruiting much higher numbers of young 
men and women for flexible and attractive 
career paths in the defence sector will therefore 
be key for the future, especially when the 
economic climate starts to deteriorate. 
 
At present, barely more than a third of the 
force is under the age of forty. In turn, the 
largest age cohorts are in their early fifties. 
During this legislative term, much ink has been 
spilled on the proposal to raise the retirement 
age for military personnel (i.e. from fifty-six to 
sixty-three, although exact details remain 
unclear). Yet the future potential of Belgian 
defence depends not so much on the ‘right 
half’ of the age pyramid as on the ‘left half’: it 
is the yearly inflow of young and motivated 
personnel that will steer the course of 
developments over the longer term. Bluntly 
put: postponing retirements will only add 
limited capability, whereas decreasing 
recruitment will have a major impact on output 
capacity. Limited recruitment and retention 
difficulties thus pose a clear danger, namely 
that the 25,000-structure envisaged by the 
Strategic Vision risks not being fully staffed. In 
this regard, it needs to be kept in mind that an 
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important number of men and women in 
uniform are not available to the organisation, 
because of educational requirements and 
contributions to international organisations, 
for instance. In real terms, the body of 
effectively available military personnel risks 
shrinking to critical levels from the early 2020s 
onwards. 
 
The logical solution is to dramatically increase 
recruitment and to limit attrition as military 
career paths progress. After the recent dip in 
recruitment, from 2018 onwards recruitment is 
set to accelerate back to cruising speed of over 
1,500 vacancies per year.15 Yet this will not 
suffice to offset the upcoming retirement 
wave. Human resources projections indicate 
that a continued build-up to 2,100 new recruits 
per year or more will be required in the 2020s 
in order to stabilise the force around the 
25,000 target. Should such numbers prove 
difficult to achieve, it will become necessary to 
adapt what military career paths may look like 
with a view to increasing their societal 
attraction. In addition, a considerable share of 
recruitment under short-term (i.e. eight year) 
contracts will need to be extended into long-
term contracts. Finally, the outflow of younger 
personnel needs to be kept within limits. To 
that purpose, it is essential that the force does 
not get worn out due to an unsustainable 
operational tempo, a lack of training or a 
general lack of recognition. The experience of 
homeland operations constitutes a double-
edged sword in this regard: Operational 
Vigilant Guardian has greatly increased the 
societal visibility of the armed forces, yet it also 
exercised a negative impact on readiness for 
other tasks, as well as on motivational levels 
inside many units. Simply put: everyone in 
uniform needs to remain an ambassador for a 
military career, yet this is critically dependent 
on the armed forces having sufficient 
confidence that their political neglect will be 
reversed. 
 
MILITARY MOBILISATION IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
The interplay between human resources, 
military equipment and training efforts gives 
rise to a force structure that is ready to deliver 
operational output as instructed by the political 
level. The force structure that the Strategic 
Vision outlines, and of which the 2018 budget 
is the first fiscal enabler, is constructed around 
the 25,000-strong personnel envelope and the 
equipment projects listed in the previous 
sections. This yields a future Belgian defence 
 
Age pyramid of the Belgian armed forces 
(as of January 2018, active military personnel, source: Belgian Defence Staff DG Human Resources) 
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apparatus principally built around (a) five 
motorised manoeuvre battalions on land, (b) a 
joint special operations regiment composed of 
the tier one Special Forces Group and two 
supporting paracommando battalions, (c) a 
multi-role air combat capability built around 
the F-16 platform and its successor and (d) a 
limited naval warfare capability built around 
frigates and mine countermeasure vessels. In 
terms of quantitative output capacity, it bears 
emphasis that this force structure will be able 
to do substantially less than what the Belgian 
armed forces have done in recent years, even if 
in some respects they will become more 
technologically advanced and supported by an 
increasingly agile, influence-enabling 
intelligence apparatus.16 Is this enough to meet 
Belgium’s national security requirements and 
international obligations in the future? As it is 
difficult to answer this question in a positive 
sense, this force structure should be considered 
as a peacetime baseline. The most fundamental 
challenge confronting the Belgian defence, is 
how to make use of this skeleton force 
structure as an instrument enabling military 
expansion and mobilisation when this should 
prove necessary. This relates not so much to 
the requirements of the conflicts of the past, 
but rather the exigencies that future 
contingencies may pose throughout the 21st 
century. 
 
Even if the security environment were to 
remain stable, it will prove difficult to meet 
Belgium’s national security requirements and 
international obligations. In the framework of 
the NATO defence planning process, Belgium 
already cannot meet the capability targets it 
gets assigned, such as the ability to deploy and 
sustain a brigade in the land domain as well as 
to field a higher number of future combat 
aircraft.17 This relates not just to crisis 
management tasks, but also to collective 
defence scenarios. To the extent that the EU 
has a codified military level of ambition, 
furthermore, Belgium will equally struggle to 
pull its weight. In international terms, Belgium 
is thus well on its way of becoming a mere 
provider of token contributions rather than a 
credible and trustworthy partner. Even in a 
purely national context, it is easy to imagine 
scenarios in which the Belgian armed forces 
would not be able to deliver the operational 
output that is required. The number of troops 
deployed on homeland duties in the immediate 
aftermath of the March 2016 terrorist attacks, 
for instance, will become impossible to sustain 
in the years ahead, as the land component 
continues to shrink.18 Yet is it truly 
inconceivable to imagine future circumstances 
in which similar or even higher numbers may 
be called for? In the same vein, the security of 
Belgian airspace or territorial waters may not 
be ensured should procurement programme 
delays or recruitment difficulties occur. The 
bottom line is that the envisaged force 
structure is designed as a minimal baseline 
during peacetime. 
 
The fundamental purpose of the armed forces 
is to serve as an instrument for defending the 
community from which they spring during 
times of conflict. If the level of ambition of 
NATO and the EU is going up, it is precisely 
because the continuation of peacetime is no 
longer guaranteed. Once one recognises that 
large-scale future conflict has become a distinct 
possibility – perhaps still remote, but no longer 
inconceivable – military requirements increase 
significantly, as factors such as combat 
attrition, security of supply and industrial and 
societal resilience need to be accounted for.19 
The purpose of the enhanced Forward 
Presence battalions in Baltic States, for 
instance, is to serve as a tripwire for deterrence 
purposes. Yet that tripwire is only as credible 
as the ability to quickly send conventional 
reinforcements or to contemplate options for 
nuclear retaliation. Without a credible 
deterrence posture, our European partners and 
allies in Central and Eastern Europe may well 
worry about the possible risk of abandonment 
in case of conflict. In turn, this fosters intra-
European fragmentation, which runs counter 
to the Belgian interest, and strengthens Russia’s 
leverage for intimidating its much smaller 
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neighbours. To the extent that the security 
environment continues to deteriorate, it is the 
hypothetical ability of the armed forces to 
engage in high-end conflict that will matter the 
most in the years ahead. After all, credible 
deterrence depends on being ready to ‘fight 
tonight’ if necessary. 
 
While one can debate what military 
mobilisation would look like in the twenty-first 
century, the political deliberations on the 
future of the Belgian armed forces have not yet 
internalised this challenge. True enough, a 
larger force structure will come at a higher 
cost. Yet at the same time it is hard to see how 
the skeleton structure currently envisaged 
would be able to cope with conditions of 
conflict if this should ever materialise. The key 
issue is therefore to consider the future 
structure not as a static target that will suffice 
to meet the requirements of the Belgian 
government irrespective of the international 
context, but rather as a dynamic minimal 
baseline from which the armed forces can be 
redeveloped in function of how the security 
environment evolves. This could mean deeper 
integration with different international partners 
when political ambitions converge, but also 
serve as a bulwark for defending the security 
interests of all Belgian citizens if the 
international political architecture continues to 
fracture. At a minimum, this would require 
redeveloping the system of professional 
reserves, yet it is also conceivable that a larger 
professional structure may again be required to 
address the emerging gaps in both combat and 
support units. In case of serious recruitment 
difficulties, one could even raise the question 
under what circumstances a twenty-first 
century version of conscription could be 
considered appropriate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the years ahead, the overarching challenge 
for the Belgian armed forces is not so much to 
arrest the post-Cold War organisational 
decline, as to start regenerating for the 
uncertain future that is yet to come. The 2018 
budget provides the initial window of 
opportunity to start this process, namely by 
increasing recruitment numbers and reserving 
commitment credits to start the modernisation 
of key weapon systems. Of course, the heavy 
lifting on the budgetary front is yet to come, as 
actual expenditures must rise in lock-step with 
contractual payments coming due. To a 
significant extent, this recapitalisation is itself 
the product of the choice to progressively 
hollow-out the force during many years of the 
past. Correspondingly, the cost of providing 
for Belgian national security will continue to 
increase – perhaps exponentially – the longer 
the turn of the tide is postponed. It is therefore 
essential that the 2018 window of opportunity 
is not missed. This would not only strengthen 
the diplomatic position of the Belgian 
government in both the Atlantic Alliance and 
the EU. More importantly, it would also 
safeguard the ability of all future governments 
to adapt Belgium’s defence posture and to help 
preserve the security interests of all generations 
yet to come. 
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